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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

JANA WESTERMAN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 960721-CA
Priority No. 2

:

TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES
The text of the following relevant statutes are provided
in this brief and Addendum B:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1996)
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2 (Supp. 1996)

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE VICTIM'S INSURANCE COMPANY IS NOT A
VICTIM UNDER UTAH'S RESTITUTION STATUTE.
(Responding to State's Brief, p. 6 n.2)
The State asserts that the Utah Supreme Court's holding
in State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d 611 (Utah 1985) is controlling.
Brief of Appellee at 6 n.2.

Even though Stayer addressed the

issue of restitution in a criminal context and held that an
insurance company can be a victim entitled to restitution, the
Court's holding is not applicable in this case.

Stayer is a 1985

case which relied upon Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (d) (1978
ed.)(Supp. 1983) for the definition of a victim.1
1

"'Victim' is a person who the court determines has suffered
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities."
Stayer, at 613 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(4) (d) (1978 ed.MSupp. 1983)).

Since 1983 the restitution statute has been amended.
Today M[f]or purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as
defined in Section 77-38-2."
(Supp. 1996).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (a) (i)

Section 77-38-2 provides in pertinent part:

"Victim of a crime" means any person against whom
the charged crime or conduct is alleged to have
been perpetrated or attempted by the defendant. .
Utah Code Ann § 77-38-2(9) (a) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
The Stayer Court in determining an insurance company
could be a victim relied on the definition of a "person" as "an
individual, a public or private corporation, a government, a
partnership, or an unincorporated association."

Stayer, at 613

(citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (d) (1978 ed. (Supp 1983) and
§ 76-3-601(5)).
However, upon relating the definition of a "person" with
the definition of a "victim" in Section 78-38-2, one will find
the victim's insurance company is not a victim.

For example, a

"'victim of a crime' means any person [insurance company] against
whom the charged crime or conduct is alleged to have been
perpetrated or attempted by the defendant. . . . "
§ 78-38-2(a)(a)(Supp. 1996).

Utah Code Ann.

The defendant, Ms. Westerman, did

not perpetrate any offense against the victim's insurance
company.

Ms. Westerman only perpetrated an offense against the

victim, Ms. Doi.

2

•

*

*

Ms. Westerman relies on her opening brief in response to
those portions of the State's brief not separately replied to
here.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Westerman respectfully requests that since the
victim's insurance company is not entitled to restitution that
the trial court's restitution order be reversed and remanded for
further proceedings.
SUBMITTED this

/Zz

day of June, 1997.

3
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explaining that he thinks the amount ex- 664 P.2d 419 (1983); Connecticut Printers,
cessive and is enclosing a check for $800 Inc. v. Gus Kroesen, Inc., 134 Cal.App.3d
as payment in full. B, after reading the 54, 184 Cal.Rptr. 436 (1982); Milgram
letter, indorses the check and deposits it Food Stores, Inc. v. Gelco Corp., 550
\n his bank for collection. B is bound by F.Supp. 992 (W.D.Mo.1982); Pillow v.
an accord under which he promises to Thermogas Co. of Walnut Ridge, 6 Ark.
accept payment of the check in satisfac- App. 402, 644 S.W.2d 292 (1982); Eder v.
tion of A's debt for repairs. The result Yvette B. Gervey Interiors, Inc., Fla.App.,
is the same if, before indorsing the 407 So.2d 312 (1981); Chancellor, Inc. v.
check, B adds the words "Accepted un- Hamilton Appliance Co., 175 N.J .Super.
der protest as part payment." The re- 345, 418 A.2d 1326 (1980); Brown v. Coastsult would be different, however, if B's al Trucking, Inc., 44 N.C.App. 454, 261
claim were liquidated, undisputed and S.E.2d 266 (1980); State Department of
matured.
Fisheries v. J-Z Sales Corp., 25 Wash.App.
(Citation omitted.) See Miller v. Prince 671, 610 P.2d 390 (1980); and Jahn v.
Street Elevator Co., supra, Wilmeth v. Bums, Wyo., 593 P.2d 828 (1979) (noted
Lee, Okla., 316 P.2d 614 (1957), and Graf
with approval in Recent Developments in
fam v. Geronda, Me., 304 A.2d 76 (1973), Utah Law, 1980 Utah L.Rev. 649, 710);
for cases where it was held that a creditor Rosenthal, Discord and
Dissatisfaction:
cannot avoid the consequences of his exer- Section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercise of dominion by a declaration that he cial Code, 78 Colum.L.Rev. 48 (1978)).
does not assent to the condition attached Several courts have stated that if they
by the debtor. The last cited case succinct- were to construe the statute to limit accord
ly stated the law to be, "The law gave the and satisfaction, it would jeopardize a con-1
plaintiffs the choice of accepting the check venient and valuable means of achieving
on defendant's terms or of returning it." informal settlements. Les Schwab Tire
[41 Marton contends that under U.C.A., Centers of Oregon, Inc. v. Ivory Ranch,
1953, § 70A-1-207, it avoided the condition Inc., supra. The law favors compromise in
placed on the check by Jensen when it order to limit litigation. Accord and satisadded the words "not full payment." Marfaction serves this goal. Air Van Lines,
ton asserts that those were words of reserInc. v. Buster, supra. As stated by Judge
vation of rights recognized by section 70ACorbin in Pillow v. Thermogas Co. of Wah
1-207.
Without deciding whether the
nut Ridge, supra, "If we were to decide
wording added by Marton could be so interthat a creditor can reserve his rights on a
preted, no authority is cited by Marton that
'payment in full' check, it would seriously*
section 70A-1-207 applies to a "full paycircumvent what has been universally acJ
ment" check. Of the authorities which we
J
have found, the better reasoned hold that cepted in the business community as a con
venient
means
for
the
resolution
of
disour section 70A-1-207 (which is identical to
section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial agreements."
Code) does not alter the common law rules
Our determination that there was an ac-.
of accord and satisfaction. See Flambeau cord and satisfaction obviates the necessity
Products Corp. v. Honeywell Information of our consideration of any of the otherj
Systems, Inc., 116 Wis.2d 95, 341 N.W.2d points raised in either appeal. The judg-j
655 (1984); R.A. Reither
Construction, ment in favor of the plaintiff is reversed,
Inc. v. Wheatland Rural Electric Associa- and the case is remanded to the trial court
tion, Colo.App., 680 P.2d 1342 (1984);
to enter judgment in favor of the defend-,
Stultz Electric Works v. Marine Hydrauant. Costs on appeal are awarded to de*
lic Engineering Co., Me., 484 A.2d 1008
fendant.
(1984); Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, supra; Les Schwab Tire Centers of Oregon,
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur*
Inc. v. Ivory Ranch, Inc., 63 Or.App. 364,

STEWART, J., dissents.
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate
herein.

^
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The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Edgar STAYER, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 20163.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 19, 1985.
After plea of no contest to charge of
arson, defendant was sentenced in the
Third District Court, Tooele County, Scott
Daniels, J., and he appealed. The Supreme
Court held that: (1) trial court properly
ordered defendant to pay restitution to insurance companies; (2) defendant's intentional burning of house acquired by bank
through trust deed foreclosure involved
"willful and malicious injury" such that
debt to bank was not discharged in bankruptcy; and (3) trial court's failure to provide written reasons for restitution award
Was harmless error.
*
Affirmed.

1. Criminal Law <s=»l 208.4(2)
It is proper for trial court to impose
restitution unless upon hearing in court
defendant objects to its imposition. U.C A
1953, 76-3-201(3)(c), 77-18-1(8).
2. Criminal Law <3=>1126
Failure of defendant to furnish transcript of sentencing hearing, thereby failing to show that he objected to imposition
of restitution or that trial court failed to
inquire into his ability to pay, precluded

defendant from raising issue as to restitution on appeal.
3. Criminal Law <£=»1208.4(2)
Defendant convicted of arson was
properly required to pay restitution to reimburse insurance companies, where defendant had monthly income of $2500 and
monthly expenses totaling $1,420.
4. Bankruptcy <&=»424
Defendant's intentional burning of
house, for which he was convicted of arson,
involved "willful and malicious injury"
such that his debt to bank, which had acquired house through trust deed foreclosure, could not be discharged in bankruptcy. U.C.A. 1953, 76-6-102, 77-181(9); Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 523,
523(a)(6).
5. Criminal Law <S=>120M(2)
"Victim" of crime is person who court
determines has suffered pecuniary damages as result of defendant's criminal activities; that person may be individual, public
or private corporation, government, partnership, or unincorporated association.
U.C.A. 1953, 76-1-601(5), 76-3-201(4)(d).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
6. Criminal Law <3=*986(3), 1177
Trial court should have stated in written order its reasons for imposing restitution upon defendant convicted of arson;
failure to do so, however, was harmless
error, in light of ample record evidence
supporting restitution award. U.C.A. 1953,
76-3-201(3)(a).

Barrie A. Vernon, Tooele, for defendant
and appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant appeals from a sentence imposed pursuant to a no contest plea to a
charge of arson, a third degree felony, in
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violation of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-102 (1978
ed.).
On April 11, 1983, Citizens Bank acquired defendant's home in Stansbury Park
through trust deed foreclosure. Four days
later, while defendant was in the process of
removing the last of his belongings from
the home, a fire broke out, causing considerable structural damage to the house. An
arson investigation disclosed that two fires
had been deliberately set with liquid accelerants. Defendant was charged with arson
and aggravated arson and pleaded no contest to the lesser offense. The greater
offense was dismissed. On March 27,
1984, defendant filed his petition in bankruptcy. On July 16 of that year, the trial
court entered its judgment and order sentencing defendant to 0 to 5 years in the
Utah State Prison, but staying execution of
the sentence and placing him on probation
on certain conditions. One of the conditions imposed was that defendant pay restitution in the amount of $10,477.34 to Farmers Insurance Co. and $12,737.20 to U.S.F.
& G., both amounts incurred by the insurance companies in repairing the home for
Citizens Bank, their insured. The rate of
repayment was to be determined by the
Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
The principal issue raised by defendant is
whether the trial court exceeded its authority in ordering defendant to reimburse the
insurance companies for their loss in compensating Citizens Bank.
Defendant
claims that the trial court erred in not
inquiring into the ability of defendant to
make the required restitution, particularly
in light of his pending bankruptcy.
[1,2] It is proper for the court to impose restitution unless upon a hearing in
court the defendant objects to its imposition. U.C.A., 1953, § 77-18-1(8) (1982 ed.)
(Supp.1983); § 76-3-201(3)(c) (Supp.1983).
We have no designation of record on appeal
and no transcript of the sentencing hearing. We therefore do not know whether
defendant objected to the imposition of restitution or whether the trial court failed to
inquire into defendant's ability to pay. We
must decline to consider the issue since it

must be presumed that it is raised for the
first time on appeal.
[3] Even if we were to reach the issue,
the record before us contains sufficient evidence to support a finding that restitution
was appropriate. A presentence investigation report prepared by the Department of
Adult Probation and Parole is in the record.
That report contains information on defendant's monthly income, computed at
$2,500, and monthly expenses totalling
$1,420. That information would appear to
furnish a proper basis for the trial court's
order of restitution.
[4] Defendant's claim that his debt to
Citizens Bank was discharged in bankruptcy is without merit. The Utah legislature
has declared that restitution imposed in
conjunction with a judgment on a criminal
offense is considered a debt for "willful
and malicious injury" for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy
as provided in title 11, section 523, U.S.
C.A.; U.C.A., 1953, § 77-18-1(9) (1982 ed.)
(Supp.1983). Defendant's restitution debt
is nondischargeable under the Bankruptcy
Code 523(a)(6) because defendant intentionally, willfully, and maliciously committed
arson. U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-102 (1978 ed.);
see Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Purk, 28
B.R. 234 (Bkrtcy.1983) (debtor committed
waste in violation of mortgage commitment, having set fire to house, and committed willful, intentional, and malicious act;
debt was nondischargeable, Bankr.Code, 11
U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(6)).
However, we desire to register a caveat
regarding U.C.A., 1953, § 77-l&-l(9),
which provides:
On a plea of guilty or no contest or
conviction of any crime or offense:
(9) Restitution imposed under this
chapter is considered a debt for "willful
and malicious injury" for purposes of
exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section
523, U.S.C.A.
(Emphasis added.) This subsection may
not comport with the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 523(a)(6) does not broadly except as
nondischargeable a debt for any crime, but

Utah
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only for "willful and malicious injury by
the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity." Bankr.Code, 11
U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(6). See United Bank of
Southgate v. Nelson, 35 Bankr.Rep. 766
(D.C.1983); In the Matter of Simmons v.
Simmons, 17 Bankr.Rep. 259 (Bkrtcy.1982).
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 excepted
from discharge "liabilities for willful and
malicious injuries to the person or property
of another." § 17(a)(8), as amended, formerly 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(8). In Tinker v.
Cohvell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48
L.Ed. 754 (1904), the Supreme Court held
as nondischargeable under this provision a
husband's recovery of damages in state
court against the bankrupt defendant for
adultery committed with the plaintiff's consenting wife. Some courts subsequently
interpreted the Supreme Court's rationale
to mean that conduct manifesting reckless
disregard for the rights of others and causing damage resulted in nondischargeable
liability for "willful" injury within the
meaning of section 17(a)(8).
Nevertheless, by replacing section
17(a)(8) of the former act with section
523(a)(6) of the 1978 code, Congress expressly intended to overrule legislatively
the reckless disregard test for nondischargeability. The new statutory language
excepts from discharge a debt only "for
willful and malicious injury by the debtor
to another." § 523(a)(6). Both the House
and the Senate reports on versions containing identical language explained that section 523(a)(6) excepted from dischargeability debts for willful and malicious injury by
the debtor and that "[ujnder this paragraph, 'willful' means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell held that a less strict standard is
intended and to the extent that other cases
have relied on Tinker to apply a 'reckless
disregard' standard, they are overruled."
H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
365 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code
Cong. & Ad.News 5787, 5963, 6320-21;
S.Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 79
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong.
& Ad.News 5787, 5865.
As summarized by a leading treatise, the
effect of the provision of the 1978 code is:

In order to fall within the exception of
section 523(a)(6), the injury to an entity
or property must have been willful and
malicious. An injury of an entity or
property may be malicious injury within
this provision if it was wrongful and
without just cause or excessive, even in
the absence of personal hatred, spite or
ill-will. The word "willful" means "deliberate or intentional," a deliberate and
intentional act which necessarily leads to
injury. Therefore, a wrongful act done
intentionally, which necessarily produces
harm and is without just cause or excuse,
may constitute a willful and malicious
injury.
3 Collier on Bankruptcy § 523.16, at 523118 (15th ed. 1983).
In the instant case, restitution imposed in
conjunction with defendant's conviction and
sentence for arson is a debt for "willful
and malicious injury" for purposes of exceptions discharged in bankruptcy. However, although correct in this fact situation,
we express concern that the sweep of section 77-1-8(9) may be too broad in other
contexts.
[5] Finally, defendant claims that there
was "no direct victim" in this case, where
the bank had been reimbursed by the insurance companies and the trial court improperly allowed the insurance companies to
subrogate their nonexisting right of collection in the state court. We have just stated that defendant's debt was not dischargeable. Apart from that, it should be noted
that a "victim" is a person who the court
determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities. U.C.A., 1953, § 76-3-20l(4)(d)
(1978 ed.) (Supp.1983). A "person" may be
an individual, a public or private corporation, a government, a partnership, or an
unincorporated association. Id., § 7 6 - 1 601(5). In line with those definitions, the
trial court properly ascertained the insurance companies as defendant's victims.
I6J Although defendant has not raised
the matter, our review of the record indicates that the order does not reflect the
reasons for the trial court's decision to
order restitution. Under the relevant stat-
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ute, if the court determines that restitution
is either appropriate or inappropriate, it
shall make the reason for the decision "a
part of its written order." U.C.A., 1953,
§ 76-3-201(3)(a) (1978 ed.) (Supp.1983).
In the case before us, there is ample
record evidence, from which the trial court
could have found that restitution was proper. Notwithstanding the mandate of the
statute that the trial court's reasons be
included as part of its order, we believe
that the failure to do so in this case was
harmless error. Nonetheless, we draw attention to this requirement for future guidance of the sentencing courts.
Defendant's sentence is affirmed in all
respects.

APACHE TANK LINES, INO, a
corporation, Plaintiff,
v.
Thomas R. CHENEY, Personal Representative of the Estate of Clifford
P. Cheney, Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas R. CHENEY, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Clifford P.
Cheney and Pamela A. Cheney and as
Co-Conservator and Co-Guardian Ad
Litem of the minor children Signa Cheney and Keenan Cheney, Leslie Skelton, as Co-Conservator and Co-Guardian Ad Litem for Signa Cheney and
Keenan Cheney, Counterclaimant and
Cross-Claimant and Appellants,
v.
COWBOY OIL COMPANY and LeGrand
B. Brunson, Cross-Claim Defendants
and Respondent.
No. 19573.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 20, 1985.
Truck owner brought action for property damage and loss of use of tractor and

trailer against personal representative of
estate of deceased occupants of automobile
involved in collision with truck; latter counterclaimed for wrongful death and joined
truck driver and his employer, who moved
for summary judgment. The Second District Court, Davis County, J. Duffy Palmer,
J., granted the motion, and appeal was
taken. The Supreme Court held that questions of fact as to whether truck driver was
negligent in head-on collision accident with
automobile precluded summary judgment
on wrongful death counterclaim.
Reversed and remanded.

1. J u d g m e n t a l 8 0
Summary judgment should be granted
with great caution in negligence cases.
2. Negligence «=»136(9, 14)
Issues of negligence ordinarily present
questions of fact to be resolved by fact
finder; it is only when facts are undisputed
and but one reasonable conclusion can be
drawn therefrom that such issues become
questions of law.
3. Negligence <s=»136(25)
Proximate cause is usually a factual
issue and in most circumstances will not be
resolved as a matter of law.
4. Judgment e=>181(33)
Questions of fact as to whether truck
driver was negligent in head-on collision'
accident with automobile precluded summary judgment in favor of truck driver and!
his employer in a wrongful death action
brought as a counterclaim on behalf of
estate and heirs of deceased occupants of
automobile.
Carl E. Malouf, Logan, for appellant.1
Tim Dalton Dunn, Salt Lake City, for
respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant appeals from a summary
judgment in favor of LeGrand Brunson and

his employer, Cowboy Oil Co., in a wrongful death action brought as a counterclaim
on behalf of the estates and heirs of Clifford P. Cheney and Pamela A. Cheney, his
wife. Brunson was the driver of a tank
tractor and trailer that collided with the
Cheneys' car, killing the Cheneys instantly.
The trial court found Brunson not negligent as a matter of law. We reverse and
remand for a trial on the merits.
On March 21, 1980, Brunson arose at
6:00 a.m., had a bowl of cereal and coffee
for breakfast, and went on duty at 11:00
a.m. He drove a loaded tanker truck and
trailer from Woods Cross, Utah, to Kemmerer, Wyoming, stopping for a hamburger and coffee between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m.
He proceeded to Nightengale, about three
miles southwest of Rock Springs, Wyoming, where the tanks were filled with
8,820 gallons of drip gas condensate, bringing the total weight of truck and trailer to
80,000-84,000 lbs. Brunson began his return trip at 9:00 p.m., stopped at Evanston
for a couple of beers, stopped at the port of
entry to help a friend with truck repairs,
and then began the last leg of his journey
to Woods Cross. It started to rain and
turned cold, and by the time Brunson left
the canyon and turned onto Route 89, he
knew he was on black ice, because it was
"slicker than hell" and people passing him
in the opposite direction had "hollered" at
him over their CB that the roads were slick
and icy.
. At around 1:30 a.m., as Brunson was
ascending a long hill north of Layton, he
accelerated to maintain a speed of his truck
and went from sixth to seventh and then to
eighth gear. The truck started to slip, and
Brunson shifted down again to seventh to
maintain a speed of about 40 m.p.h. It was
at this point that he first noticed the headlights of Cheneys' oncoming car when it
crested the hill ahead of him.
ii-i

i, Here the evidence becomes confusing.
In his deposition, Brunson testified that the
headlights of the car suddenly disappeared.
Without slowing down, Brunson got over
as far off to the right as he could go,
thinking he could get away from the car.

He looked down at his speedometer, which
read between 40 and 45 m.p.h., and when
he next looked up, the headlights of the
Cheney car were right in front of him. His
truck crushed the car and its occupants
inside.
In the statement given to the police,
Brunson stated the Cheney car made a
U-turn and entered his lane, and he tried to
miss it. He amended that statement the
following morning and added: "Car looked
like it was making U-turn. Lights were
aimed towards me when first saw him,
thought I wonder what he's going to do,
then I lost lights and almost as quick he
was in front of me and I hit him."
Defendant was sued by Apache Tank
Lines, owner of the Brunson truck, for
property damage and loss of use of the
tractor and trailer. Defendant counterclaimed for wrongful death and joined
Brunson and Cowboy Oil Co. in this suit.
Brunson and Cowboy Oil Co. moved for
summary judgment, claiming that undisputed facts established that Brunson was
not negligent as a matter of law. Defendant opposed the motion on the ground that
the evidence before the court showed material disputed facts from which a jury might
find Brunson negligent.
[1-31 In an appeal from a summary
judgment, we view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
losing party. Hall v. Warren, Utah, 632
P.2d 848 (1981); accord Blackhurst
v.
Transamerica Insurance Co., Utah, 699
P.2d 688 (1985).
Summary judgment
should be granted with great caution in
negligence cases.
Williams v. Melby,
Utah, 699 P.2d 723 (1985). Issues of negligence ordinarily present questions of fact
to be resolved by the fact finder. It is only
when the facts are undisputed and but one
reasonable conclusion can be drawn therefrom that such issues become questions of
law. FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby
Insurance Co., Utah, 594 P.2d 1332 (1979).
Likewise, proximate cause is usually a factual issue and in most circumstances will
not be resolved as a matter of law. Uni-
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PART 2
SENTENCING
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Hearing —
Definitions.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
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responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings
and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in
Subsection (4)(c).
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's
criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(g) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law
to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty.
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
agreement. For purpqses_oiLrestitution, a victim has the meaning as
defined in Sectionc^T-38-2 and family member has the meaning as
defined in Section 77^37-2:—~"
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections
(4)£ci-a«d44^41(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in
Subsection (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of
the order to the parties.
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the
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restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of,
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover
reasonable attorney's fees.
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77,
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended
by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4)(c).
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete
restitution and court-ordered restitution.
(U)/Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant.
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing.
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be
determined as provided in Subsection (8).
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for
the decision a part of the court record.
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment,
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim.
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63,
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the
defendant a full hearing on the issue.
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(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal
charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor, and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported;
and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported,
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (c)(i) applies to
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants
actually transported in a single trip.
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing
guidelines regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice.
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child,
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over
any conflicting provision of law.
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or
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a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or
pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care,
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation: and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense
resulted in the death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for courtordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order
of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to
provide restitution to the victim.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201. e n a c t e d b y L.
1973, c h . 196, § 76-3-201: 1979, c h . 69, § 1;
1981, c h . 59, 5 1; 1983, c h . 8 5 . § 1: 1983, c h .
88, § 3; 1984, c h . 18, § 1: 1986, c h . 156, § 1;
1987, ch- 107, $ 1; 1990, ch. 8 1 , $ 1; 1992, c h .
142, $ 1:1993, c h . 17, § 1; 1994, c h . 13, § 19;
1995, c h . I l l , 5 1; 1995, c h . 117, $ 1; 1995,
c h . 301, § 1; 1995, c h . 337, § 1; 1995 (1st
S.S.), c h . 10, § 1; 1996, c h . 40, § 1; 1996, c h .
79, § 98; 1996, c h . 2 4 1 , §§ 2, 3 .
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1995 amendm e n t by ch. I l l , effective May 1, 1995, added
"or for conduct for which the defendant has
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
agreement" and made a related change in Subsection (4XaXi).
The 1995 a m e n d m e n t by ch. 117, effective
May 1, 1995, inserted "the accrual of interest
from the time of sentencing"' in Subsection
(l)(d) f changed "person adjudged guilty"' to "person convicted" in Subsection (2), and added
Subsections (4)(aKiii; and (4Hd>(iii;.
The 1995 amendment by ch. 301, effective
May 1, 1995, added "and as further defined in

Subsection (4)(c;" at the end of Subsection
(l)(dV, rewrote Subsection (4) to revise the criteria and procedures for ordering restitution;
added Subsection (8); and made several stylistic changes.
The 1995 amendment by ch. 337, effective
April 29, 1996, added Subsection (2)(g), redesignated former Subsection (2)(g) as Subsection
(2)(h>, and deleted former Subsection (7Xc),
requiring sentencing to the aggravated mandatory term in cases of substantial bodily injury to
children during the commission of child kidnapping or various listed child sexual assaults.
The 1995 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective
April 29, 1996, substituted "April 29, 1996" for
"May 1, 1995" in Subsection (2)(g;.
The 1996 amendment by ch. 40, effective
April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsection
(2Xg;, which read: "on or after April 29.1996, to
imprisonment at not less than five years and
which may be for life for an offense under Title
76, Chapter 5, Part 4, and Sections 76-5-301.1
and 76-5-302: or" and redesignated former Subsection (2Xh) as Subsection (2Kgr, deleted
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former Subsection (7), relating to resentencing
of a defendant subject to mandatory sentencing
under Subsection 16); and added Subsection (7).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 79, effective
April 29, 1996, in Subsection (2Xb) substituted
•removal or disqualification from" for "removal
from or disqualification of* and in Subsection
(4XaXi) added "Section" before "77-37-2."
The 1996 amendment by ch. 241, §§ 2 and 3,
effective April 29, 1996, added Subsections
<4XaKvii)and(4XdXiv).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
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Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Compiler's Notes. - Laws 1995, ch. 301, §
6 provides that the amendments in ch. 117 to
Subsection (4XaXiii) shall merge into this section, as amended by ch. 301, as Subsection
(4XaXvi).
Laws 1995, ch. 337 was effective May 1,1995;
however, § 76-3-201.3 postponed the amendment of this section by ch. 337 until April 29,
1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Mitigating factors.
Cited.

trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing
to list lack of a history of sex-related crimes as
a mitigating factor. State v. Wright, 262 Utah
Adv. Rep. 11 (Utah Ct App. 1995).

Mitigating factors.
In sentencing for conviction of aggravated
sexual assault, in light of defendant's extensive
history of violent and antisocial crimes, the

Cited in State v. Smith, 280 Utah Adv. Rep. 6
(Utah 1995); State v. Tenney, 286 Utah Adv.
Rep. 14 (Utah Ct App. 1996).
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CHAPTER 38
RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS ACT
Section
77-38-2.
77-38-3.

77-38-4.

77-38-5,

77-38-6.
77-38-7.

77-38-2.

Definitions.
Notification to victims — Initial
notice, election to receive subsequent notices — Form of notice
— Protected victim information.
Right to be present and to be
heard — Control of disruptive
acts or irrelevant statements —
Statements trom persons m custody.
Application to felonies of the declaration of the rights of crime
victims.
Victim's right to privacy.
Victim's right to a speedy trial.

Section
77-38-8.
77-38-9.

77-38-10.
77-38-11.
77-38-12.

77-38-14.

Age-appropriate language at judicial proceedings — Advisor.
Representative of victim — Court
designation — Representation
in cases involving minors —
Photographs in homicide cases.
Victim's discretion.
Enforcement — Appellate Review
— No right to money damages.
Construction of this chapter — No
right to set aside conviction, adjudication, admission, or plea —
Severability clause.
Notice of expungement petition —
Victim's right to object.

Definitions.

For the purposes of this chapter and the Utah Constitution:
(1) "Abuse" means treating the crime victim in a manner so as to injure,
damage, or disparage.
(2) "Dignity" means treating the crime victim with worthiness, honor,
and esteem.
(3) "Fairness" means treating the crime victim reasonably, evenhandedly, and impartially.
(4) "Harassment" means treating the crime victim in a persistently
annoying manner.
(5) "Important criminal justice hearings" or "important juvenile justice
hearings" means the following proceedings in felony criminal cases or
cases involving a minor's conduct which would be a felony if committed by
an adult:
(a) any preliminary hearing to determine probable cause;
(b) any court arraignment where practical;
(c) any court proceeding involving the disposition of charges
against a defendant or minor or the delay of a previously scheduled
trial date but not including any unanticipated proceeding to take an
admission or a plea of guilty as charged to all charges previously filed
or any plea taken at an initial appearance;
(d) any court proceeding to determine whether to release a defendant or minor and, if so, under what conditions release may occur,
excluding any such release determination made at an initial appearance;
(e) any criminal or delinquency trial, excluding any actions at the
trial that a court might take in camera, in chambers, or at a sidebar
conference;
(f) any court proceeding to determine the disposition of a minor or
sentence, fine, or restitution of a defendant or to modify any disposition of a minor or sentence, fine, or restitution of a defendant; and
(g) any public hearing concerning whether to grant a defendant or
minor parole or other form of discretionary release from confinement.
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(6) "Reliable information" means information worthy of confidence,
including any information whose use at sentencing is permitted by the
United States Constitution.
(7) "Representative of a victim" means a person who is designated by
the victim or designated by the court and who represents the victim in the
best interests of the victim.
(8) "Respect" means treating the crime victim with regard and value.
(9) (a) "Victim of a crime" means any person against whom the charged
crime or conduct is alleged to have been perpetrated or attempted by
the defendant or minor personally or as a party to the offense or
conduct or. in the discretion of the court, against whom a related crime
or act is alleged to have been perpetrated or attempted, unless the
natural person is the accused or appears to be accountable or
otherwise criminally responsible for or criminally involved in the
crime or conduct or a crime or act arising from the same conduct,
criminal episode, or plan as the crime is defined under the laws of this
state.
(b) For purposes of the right to be present, "victim of a crime" does
not mean any person who is in custody as a pretrial detainee, as a
prisoner following conviction for an offense, or as a juvenile who has
committed an act that would be an offense if committed by an adult,
or who is in custody for mental or psychological treatment.
(c) For purposes of the right to be present and heard at a public
hearing as provided in Subsection 77-38-2(5Kg) and the right to notice
as provided in Subsection 77-38-3(7)(a), "victim of a crime" includes
any victim originally named in the allegation of criminal conduct who
is not a victim of the offense to which the defendant entered a
negotiated plea of guilty.
History: C. 1953, 77-38-2, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 198, § 3: 1995, ch. 352, § 8; 1996,
ch. 79, § 106; 1996, ch. 216, § 1; 1996, ch.
241, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, added Subsections
(1) to (4) and (7), redesignating the other subsections m alphabetical order, in Subsection
(5), added "important juvenile justice hearings"'
as a term defined and added related references
throughout the subsection to make the definition applicable to minors; in Subsection ( 5/'c;,
inserted "an admission or"; and in Subsection

(9)(a), added "or conduct" and "or act" in several
places and "or minor" after "defendant."
The 1996 amendment by ch. 79, effective
April 29, 1996, redesignated former Subsections (7) and (8) as Subsections (8) and (7).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 216, effective
April 29, 1996. added Subsection i9)(c>.
The 1996 amendment by ch. 241, effective
April 29, 1996, deleted "natural" before "person
against" in Subsection (9)(aj.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

